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WA8HINGTON LAW REVIEW
DUMPOR S CASE: ITS STATUS.&-"Always a stumbling-block in
the way of the profession, 'originally without foundation. , with-
out subsequent confirmation by decision until' Brummel v. MacPher-
son, 14 Ves. 173, ' no greater claim to be recognized at that
time as settled law than any other venerable error. P ) 1 Such is
a characterization of the notorious "Dumper's Case." Its question
is one which has not yet arisen in Washington, and a consideration of
it may prove interesting, in the event that the point come up in this
state.
Dumpor's Case holds, according to the syllabus in Sir Edward
Coke's Reports (4 Coke 119b) that "a condition in a lease that the
lessee or his assigns shall not alien without the special license of the
lessor, is determined by an alienation by licence, and no subsequent
alienation is a breach of condition, nor does it give a right of entry
to the lessor." The same case more properly titled "Dumpor v
Symms" (Coke) or "Dumper v Syms" is reported by Sir George
Croke (Croke's Eliz. 815) The head note there reads: "On a pro-
viso that a lessee and his assigns shall not alien without licence, if
the lessor give licence, the condition is entirely destroyed and the as-
signee may afterwards assign or demise the whole or any part of the
term without licence; but otherwise a devise of the term would have
been a breach of the condition."
Croke indicates that this case was decided in 43 Eliz. in the
Queen s Bench. At that time the officers of that court were Sir
John Popham, Chief Justice, Sir Francis Gawdy, Sir Edward Fenner
and Sir John Clerch, Justices, Sir Edward Coke, Attorney General
and Sir Thomas Fleming, Solicitor General.
Sir Edward Coke states the decision as of Hilary Term of 45
Eliz. This divergence of opinion between the reporters is like-
wise to be found in the story they have written of what took place
and what was actually decided.
A careful survey of the two reporters indicates that they are of
about equal learning and integrity Croke's reports are of un-
questioned veracity except insofar as error is to be found in all the
early reports. On the other hand Coke was a jurist of greater emi-
nence, altho in political disfavor during much of his troublous life.
It is reputed of him that in his desire to have all reported cases
logical and grounded on accepted legal doctrines, he often added or
subtracted and frequently inserted his statement of the controlling
principles.
All this preliminary statement is only of value in seeking to ar-
rive without prejudice at a correct statement of what Dumpor's Case
really held-then we may wisely launch forth in this present attempt
to determine just what force and validity the doctrine of Dumpor's
Case has in this day and age.
Coke's report is by far the most complete; but the statement ac-
1 Washburn on Real Prop., 503 n., with quotations from 7 Am. Law
Rev. 616-640.
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cepted for the purposes of this paper is one determined by a care-
ful comparison and study of both the learned reporters.
The facts which gave rise to the case may thus briefly be stated.
1. A lease for years was made by Oxford College to Bolde.
2. It was a term of this lease that "the lessee or his assigns should
not alien the premises to any person or persons without the special
license of the lessors."
3. Five years later the lessors by their deed licensed the lessee
to alien or demise the land or any part of it to any person or per-
sons whom he pleased.
4. Bolde assigned the term to Tubb.
5. Tubb devised the term to his son.
6. The administrator of the son assigned the term to the de-
fendant.
7 The lessor, Oxford College attempted to enter for breach of
condition.
8. This action of trespass was then brought.
9. Decision for the lessee. The license once given, the condition
is gone forever.
It is to be noted that the license to alien originally given was
general, and not specifically limited, that the license was expressly
given in writing; and that the knowledge of the lessor as to the vari-
ous transfers is not indicated or deemed important.
The basis of the decision is simple enough, viz., that.a condition
may not be apportioned - it must be binding for the whole of the
estate or none of it.
As to whether this reason may be sound is dependent on the mean-
ing given the term "condition." The following definition is found
in Co. Litt. 201a-"A qualification or restitution annexed by him
that hath an estate, or interest or right to the same, whereby an
estate, etc., may either be defeated, enlarged, or created upon an
uncertain event."
Within this generally accepted and very broad construction of the
term, it seems to be false logic to say that a condition cannot be ap-
portioned. This, in the face of considerable ancient authority that
a condition may not be apportioned, 2 but the rule and the cases
are based on earlier cases holding that a general condition against
alienation in a lease is void because repugnant to the grant. 3 This
was later resolved not to be the law 4 But in the interim Dumpor's
Case had been decided-and it has been an anomaly in the law of
Landlord and Tenant ever since,-always strictly construed, heart-
ily disapproved, yet followed with little or no enthusiasm.
2 Leeds v. Crompton, 1 Rol. Abr. 472 Pl. 7, Winter's Case, Dy. 308b;
Anon., Dy. 152 P1. 7" Wright v. Burroughs, 3 C. B. 685-699.
3 Stickley v. Butler, Hob. 170.
4 Dennis v. Laving, Hard. 427, Weatherall v. Geering, 12 Vesey
511.
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Thus it was that the rule in Dumper v. Symnms became law and
the doctrine of precedent and stare decisis carried it down to modern
times.
In England, because of legislative enactment, the doctrine is no
longer law 5
In America we adopted the common law of England as our "rule
and guide," when we separated from the mother country The doc
trine of Dumpor's Case was part and parcel of that common law"too firmly settled to be judicially reviewed."
There has been no tendency to enlarge upon the rule. It has
been kept within rather narrow confines. The chief difficulty has
been the inability of American courts to analyze the true holding of
the original case, and there is consequently much contrariety of de-
cision. The case has been as often misstated as correctly quoted.
Before attempting to reconcile the conflicting views of judicial
opinion in America, and seeking the true principle of law in-
volved, the difference between condition and covenant should be
noted. There may be a covenant against assigning without license;
there may be a condition against assigning without license; there may
be both. Breach of the condition alters the estate; breach of the
covenant gives rise to a right of action for damages. The covenant
continues after the condition is gone-which is an anomaly arising
purely out of the rule in Dumpor's Case.
It was previously stated that there is no tendency in modern juris-
prudence toward enlarging the doctrine. The result is that the better
5 22 and 23 Vict. e. 35 §§ 1, (Lord St. Leonard's Act)
"An Act to further amend the Law of Property and to relieve
Trustees (Aug. 13, 1869).
"Be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled and by the authority
of the same, as follows:
LEASES
1. Where any license to do any Act which without such license
would create a Forfeiture, or give a right to re-enter, under a Con-
dition or Power reserved in any Lease heretofore granted or to be
hereafter granted, shall at any time after the passing of this Act be
given to any Lessee or his Assigns every such License shall, unless
otherwise expressed, extend only to the Permission actually given,
or to any specific Breach of any Proviso or Covenant made or to be
made or to the actual Assignment, under lease or other Matter there-
by specifically authorized to be done, but not so as to prevent any
Proceeding for any subsequent Breach (unless otherwise specified in
such license) and all Rights under covenants and Powers of For-
feiture and Re-entry in the Lease contained shall remain in full force
and virtue, and shall be available as against any subsequent Breach
of Covenant or Condition. Assignment, Under-Lease, or other Matter
not specifically authorized or made dispunishable by such License, in
the same manner as if no such License had been given, and the Con-
dition or Right of Re-entry shall be and remain in all respects as if
such License had not been given except in respect of the particular
Matter authorized to be done."
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considered cases accept the doctrine of Dumpor v. Symms confining
it to the narrowest. limits. At the same time they say that an oral
license does not destroy the condition. If all this be true, wherein
does the reason lie? The basis of the original decision that a condi-
tion may not be apportioned is gone as is the morning mist before
the gentle light of modern judicial insight-but the doctrine which
resulted from that original reasoning lives on with manly vigor,
and the result is that it is humanly impossible to reconcile modern
cases on assignment of leases.
This leads to a consideration of the modern American cases. Let
us examine into the rule they establish.
If a general license is given by the lessor, the condition is gone
forever, 6 (altho an assignment by operation of law does not touch
the condition.) 7
This does not apply to a covenant. 8
There is a difference between licenses and waivers. 9 Silent ac-
quiescence or waiver is not a license, and does not void the condition
as to subsequent breaches, 10 and the condition is revived by a new
notice of enforcement. 11
A license specifically restricted does not void the condition. 12
A continuing condition is not avoided by acquiescence or waiver. 13
6 Bleecker v. Smith, 13 Wend. 531 (N. Y.) German-American Sav-
ings Bank v. Collmer, 155 Cal. 683, 24 L. N. S. 1066, 102 Pac. 932;
Pennock v. Lyons, 118 Mass. 92; Sharon Iron Co. v. City of Erie, 41
Pa. St. 341, Contra, Kew v. Trainor, 150 111. 150, 37 N. E. 223.
7 Gazley v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41, 52 L. Ed. 950.
8 Springer v. Chicago Real Estate Loan & Tr. Co., 202 IlL 17, 66 N.
E. 850; Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486; Dakin v. Williams, 22 Wend. 201,
209; Gannett v. Albree, 103 Mass. 372.
9 Armsby v. Woodward, 6 B. & C. 519; Beckenbach v. Harlow, 31
Ohio C. C. 496; Heeter v. Eckstein, 50 How Pr. 445, Lloyd v. Crispe,
5 Taunt. 249, 257- Mason v. Cordu, 7 Taunt. 9, 11n.
10 Ireland v. Nichols, 46 N. Y. 413; Hepp Wall Paper & Mercantile
Co. v. Deahl, 125 Pac. 491 (Colo.) Seaver v. Coburn, 10 Cush. 324
(Mass.) Douglas v. Herms, 53 Minn. 204, 54 N. W 1112; Zotalis v-
Cannellos, 138 Minn. 179, 164 N. W 807- Gluck v. Elkan, 36 Minn.
80, 30 N. W 446; Doe dem Boscawen v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 735; Johnson
v. Seaborg, 69 Ore. 27, 137 Pac. 191, Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich
56, 47 N. W 47. Contra: German-American Savings Bank v. Gollmer,
155 Cal. 683. 24 L. N. S. 1066, 102 Pac. 932; Murray v. Harway, 56 N.
Y. 337.
11 Carpenter v. Wilson, 100 Md. 13, 59 At. 186, Hanson v. Hanson
Hardware Co., 23 N. D. 169, 135 N. W 766.
12 Farr v. Kenyon, 20 R. I. 376, 39 L. R. A. 773, 39 AUt. 241, Hepl>
Wall Paper & Mercantile Co. v. Deahl, 125 Pac. 491 (Colo.) Kew v.
Trainor, 150 Ill. 150, 37 N. E. 223; Moss v. Chappell, 126 Ga. 196, 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, 54 S. E. 968; Springer v. Chicago Real Estate
Loan & Trust Co., 202 Ill. 17, 66 N. E. 850.
13 Farwell v. Easton, 63 Mo. 446; Bleecker v. Smith, 13 Wend. 531
(N. Y.) Jackson v. Allen, 3 Cowen 229; Adams v. Ore Knob Copper
Co., 7 Fed. 634; Doe dem Ambler v. Woodbridge, 9 B. & C. 376; Doe
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The rule as to covenant differs from the one as to condition, for
a covenant is not gone by general license. 14 Silent acquiescence or
waiver as to one breach of covenant does not void the covenant as
to subsequent breaches 15 or continuing breaches. 16 Breach of cove-
nant gives right to damages 17 or injunction 18 or specific perform-
ance, 19 none of which is given by a condition. 20
The rule in Lumpor's Case has as yet never been directly passed
upon in the State of Washington. Our court, however, seems to
recognize the doctrine of waiver, 21 and by statute, Washington gives
the right to declare a forfeiture for breach of a covenant not to as-
sign or sublet. 22
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dem Flower v. Peck, 1 B. & A. 428; Crocker v. Old South Society 106
Mass 489.
14 Sharon Iron Co. v City of Erie, 41 Pa. St. 341.
15 Jones v Durrer, 96 Cal. 95, 30 Pac. 1027" Bleecker v. Smith, 13
Wend. 531 (N. Y.).
16Alexander v. Hodges, 41 Mich- 691, 3 N. W 187" Bleecker v.
Smith, 13 Wend. 531 (N. Y.).
17Buckner v. Warren, 41 Ark. 532; Weller v. Brown, 160 Col. 515,
117 Pac. 517" Thornton v. Trammill, 39 Ga. 202; Brown's Adm. v.
Bragg, 22 Ind. 122; DeLancry v. Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9" Woodruff v. Tren-
ton Water Power Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 489, 508; Spear v. Fuller, 8 N. H.
174, 28 A. D. 391, Simmons v. Jarman, 122 N. C. 195, 295 S. E. 332;
Smith v. People's Natural Gas Co., 257 Pa. 396, 101 At. 739" Johnson
v Gurley 52 Tex. 222.
18 Godfrey v. Black, 39 Kan. 193, 7 A. S. R. 544, 17 Pac. 849 Maddex
v. White, 4 Md. 72, 59 A. D: 67- Spalding Hotel Co. v. Emerson, 69
Minn. 292, 72 N. W 119" Orvis v. Natl. Com'l Bank, 80 N. Y. S. 1029;
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Neilsen, 77 Neb. 868, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)
494, 110 N. W 746, McEacharn v Colton (1902) App Cas. 104.
19 Tscheider v. Biddle, 4 Dill 58; Monihon v. Wakelin, 6 Ariz. 225,
56 Pac. 735, Hall v. Center, 40 Cal. 63; Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md.
530; King v. Raab, 123 Iowa 632, 99 N. W 306, Hayes v. O'Brien, 149
Ill. 403, 23 L. R. A. 555, 37 N. E. 73; Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25,
100 A. D. 252; N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. St. George's Church, 12
Abb. N. C. 50; Kollock v. Scribner, 98 Wis. 104, 73 N. W 776.
20 Hale v Finch, 104 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 732; Seaboard Air Line R.
Co. v. Armiston Mfg. Co., 186 Ala. 269, 65 So. 187" Sanitary Dist. of
Chicago v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 Ill. 529, 116 N. E. 161,
Close v. Burlington C. R. & N. Ry Co., 64 Iowa 149, 19 N. E. 843;
Blanchard v. Letroit L. & L. M. R. Co., 31 Mich. 43, 18 A. R. 142;
Wooduff v. Trenton Water Power Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 489; Palmer v.
Fort Plain & C. Plank Road Co., 11 N. Y. 376, Erwin v. Hurd, 13 Abb.
N. C. 91, Sharon Iron Co. v. Erie, 41 Pa. 341.
21 Andersonian Inv. Co. v. Wade, 108 Wash. 373.
22 Rem. Comp. Stat. § 812, Pierce's Code 1923, § 7970, L. '05, p. 173.
